China's Resolve to Safeguard Nuclear Non-Proliferation
More bombs leads to more bombs
For this irregular issue of The Monitor, reached out to Zhang Tuosheng å¼ æ²±ç”Ÿ at Grandview Institution, a private thinktank in Beijing. In the article below, Zhang elaborates several perspectives on the dangers of nuclear proliferation worth considering and compares the potential dangers of additional nuclear powers in the Middle East to the nuclearization of North Korea. One of his key points is that proliferation begets proliferation. Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon would spur an arms race throughout the Middle East, most concerningly potentially including non-state actors.
China’s non-proliferation position remains a near concensus position among the government statements and opinion pages we follow. It should be taken seriously. Even from the most cycnical perspective, nuclear conflict in the Middle East is bad for business. China is Israel’s third largest trading partner and its largest trading partner in East Asia. It is a strong enough relationship to withstand the Beijing Declaration, and the value both sides place on maintaining it is an important piece of the calculation now when thinking about China’s relations with Iran. However, I don’t think this level of cycnicism is necessary. Zhang is right that proliferation begets proliferation. An increase in nuclear powers would ultimately lead to a more dangerous world in general. The safer world is one with no nuclear powers. Getting there, however, is a different question.
Thanks,
Nick
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China's Resolve to Safeguard Nuclear Non-Proliferation
China’s stance on nuclear non‑proliferation has been steadfast, and it has strengthened significantly since joining the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992. When it comes to Iran, China’s position is unequivocal: we do not support its pursuit of nuclear weapons, while fully respecting its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
First, national security is a fundamental consideration. If more countries—especially those in close proximity to China—were to develop nuclear weapons, it would create serious challenges and risks for Chinese national security. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in the late 1990s and became de facto nuclear‑armed states, despite never joining the NPT. North Korea and Iran, however, are different: both were once signatories of the NPT (though North Korea later withdrew). Should any state within the NPT framework move to develop nuclear weapons, it would risk triggering the collapse of the global nuclear non‑proliferation regime. The resulting sharp rise in nuclear risks would be highly detrimental to the security of both China and the world.
Second, nuclear safety and accident prevention must be a priority. In many smaller nations, the ability to secure nuclear facilities and weapons is weaker than the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council(P5). This elevates the risk that non‑state actors could obtain nuclear weapons, including the threat of nuclear terrorism. This was precisely the core concern addressed by the Nuclear Security Summits. (Editor’s Note: The Nuclear Security Summit was held four times over a span of six years, from 2010 to 2016. Initiated by then‑U.S. President Obama, these meetings aimed to strengthen global nuclear material security and prevent nuclear terrorism, with the 2016 Washington Summit marking the conclusion of the series.) Inadequate safeguards also raise the risk of nuclear accidents, posing serious threats to both regional and global security.
From a geostrategic standpoint, both Iran and North Korea are located in highly sensitive areas. North Korea’s nuclearization has prompted serious discussions in South Korea and Japan about acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In response, the United States has reaffirmed its extended deterrence and could even consider the re‑deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, presenting a direct challenge to Chinese security.
In the Middle East, where Iran is located, tensions run deep. The long‑standing rivalry between Israel and Iran, compounded by sectarian divides between Sunni and Shiite Muslim communities, has created a highly volatile environment. If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, the consequences would extend well beyond Israel’s security threshold. Israel has long viewed a nuclear‑armed Iran as an existential threat, especially given past Iranian statements about wiping Israel off the face of earth. For Iran to achieve the capability to build a nuclear weapon would be intolerable for Israel—and likely for the United States—raising the specter of a major war in the Middle East, one that will be more dangerous than the ongoing Gaza conflict. Moreover, an Iran armed with nuclear bombs would almost certainly trigger a regional nuclear arms race, prompting other major Sunni Arab nations to seek their own deterrent. The resulting wave of nuclear proliferation would deepen the Middle East crisis, posing incalculable risks for both regional and global peace and stability.
Although China firmly opposes the development of nuclear weapons by Iran—or any other state— we have always advocated resolving such issues through political and diplomatic means. The Chinese approach applies both to the Korean Peninsula and to Iran. We have facilitated the Six‑Party Talks, supported direct negotiations between the United States and North Korea, and acted as an active and constructive participant in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We firmly believe these remain the best ways to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the risk of a crisis. Resorting to force is an extremely dangerous path, especially given the precarious state of affairs in the Middle East.
As for media claims that China has played a role in aiding Iran—or North Korea—in acquiring nuclear weapons, this is sheer nonsense. China has never offered any assistance in the development of nuclear weapons to either country, and it will continue to oppose nuclear proliferation in all its forms.
Zhang Tuosheng is the Director of the Academic Committee and Director of the Northeast Asian Studies Center at the Grandview Institution, a privatethink-tank based in Beijing. He served as a lecture at the People's Liberation Army Military Academy in his early career, and later as a researcher at the National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies, and a Deputy Defense Attaché at the Chinese Embassy in the UK. From 1992 to 2024, he held various positions including Senior Fellow at the China Institute for International Strategic Studies. His main research areas include China-U.S. relations, China-Japan relations, Asia-Pacific security, military security crisis management, and China's foreign policy.
The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) and not those of The Carter Center.
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That’s all from Atlanta. Y’all be good.