
As U.S.–China competition increasingly extends into the Western Hemisphere, Latin America has become a key—yet often misunderstood—arena of strategic change. In this interview, Francisco Urdinez, Associate Professor at the Institute of Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile and Director of both the Center for Asian Studies and the Millennium Nucleus on China and Latin America (ICLAC), discusses how U.S. influence in the region has gradually eroded. Drawing on his book Economic Displacement: China and the End of US Primacy in Latin America (Cambridge University Press 2026), Urdinez argues that China’s expanding presence is not primarily the result of geopolitical confrontation, but of structural economic shifts created by Washington’s retreat from trade, investment, and development finance over the past two decades.
Urdinez explains how China’s growing economic role has reshaped Latin American governments’ policy choices, public opinion, and voting behavior in international institutions. He also warns that Washington’s increasingly security-driven response, particularly in cases such as Venezuela, may compensate for declining economic leverage in the short term while further weakening U.S. credibility in the region. Together, the interview offers a clear framework for understanding how economic displacement—rather than ideology alone—is redefining U.S.–China competition in Latin America and shaping the region’s future strategic choices.
Juan Zhang: The situation in Venezuela remains highly uncertain following the U.S. capture of its President Nicolás Maduro. What does this remarkable incident tell us about the direction of U.S. power projection in Latin America?
Francisco Urdinez: The U.S. intervention in Venezuela is a watershed moment that reveals a fundamental shift in how the United States projects power in Latin America, but it’s a shift born of weakness rather than strength. What this incident tells us is that the United States is increasingly resorting to coercive and military means to maintain influence in the region precisely because it has lost the economic capacity to compete effectively with China.
In my book Economic Displacement, I demonstrate that U.S. hegemony in Latin America was historically built on economic foundations: the provision of goods, services, credit, and market access. Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. monopoly in providing both private and public goods laid the foundation for its hegemonic legitimacy. However, between 2001 and 2020, the United States essentially delegated this role to China while focusing its attention and resources elsewhere, particularly on the Middle East and later on managing its domestic political challenges.
The Venezuela intervention represents an implicit acknowledgment that the United States cannot, or will not, reverse economic displacement through traditional economic competition. Reversing displacement would require sustained and massive provision of alternative economic goods at a scale comparable to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. American initiatives like Build Back Better World or the Americas Partnership have consistently failed to deliver financing and infrastructure investment at the necessary scale. The political will simply doesn’t exist in Washington to commit the resources required for a genuine economic re-engagement with Latin America.
What we’re witnessing, then, is the militarization of U.S. strategy in Latin America. When you can’t compete economically, you resort to the tools you still have: military power and coercive diplomacy. But this approach has severe limitations. Military intervention can isolate a country in the short term, but it doesn’t build infrastructure, doesn’t provide development financing, and doesn’t create the economic opportunities that Latin American countries desperately need and that China has been providing. The Venezuela case may successfully remove Maduro, but it doesn’t address the structural conditions that led Venezuela and much of South America to deepen economic ties with China in the first place.
This direction of U.S. power projection is ultimately unsustainable and counterproductive. It may produce short-term tactical victories, but it accelerates the very dynamics it aims to reverse by further eroding U.S. legitimacy and soft power in the region.
JZ: If the United States wants to “re-engage” effectively in Latin America, is it enough to offer security partnerships, or must it fundamentally change its economic offering to compete with the Belt and Road Initiative?
FU: Security partnerships alone are fundamentally insufficient for effective U.S. re-engagement in Latin America. My research demonstrates conclusively that influence in the region is built primarily on economic foundations, not security cooperation. The United States must fundamentally transform its economic offering to have any hope of reversing the displacement that has already occurred in ten of twelve South American countries.
The core finding of my book is that economic displacement occurs when the economic weight of one country (measured through trade, investment, credit, and aid relative to GDP) surpasses that of another. China’s success in Latin America wasn’t primarily about superior strategy or aggressive expansion, it was about filling economic voids left by U.S. retrenchment. Between 2001 and 2020, Chinese investments and financing addressed unmet developmental needs throughout the Global South. Latin American countries turned to Chinese goods as viable alternatives precisely because American options were lacking or absent.
What would genuine U.S. re-engagement require? First, it would need massive, sustained infrastructure investment comparable to what China has provided through the Belt and Road Initiative. We’re talking about hundreds of billions of dollars in roads, ports, railways, energy projects, and telecommunications infrastructure. Second, it would require competitive development financing through institutions like the Export-Import Bank at scales and terms competitive with Chinese policy banks. Third, it would need expanded market access and trade opportunities that recognize Latin America’s evolving economic structure, not just traditional commodity exports.
Critically, this can’t be a short-term, politically driven initiative that changes with each administration. One of China’s advantages has been consistency and patience. Chinese economic engagement has persisted across multiple U.S. presidential administrations, creating reliability that Latin American governments value. A credible U.S. re-engagement would need bipartisan support and institutional mechanisms that ensure continuity beyond electoral cycles.
The Venezuela intervention actually illustrates why the security-focused approach fails. Even if militarily successful, it doesn’t resolve the fundamental question: who will finance Venezuela’s reconstruction? Who will invest in its infrastructure? Who will provide the credit its economy needs to function? If the answer isn’t “the United States,” then the structural conditions favoring Chinese economic engagement will simply reassert themselves over time, regardless of who holds political power in Caracas.
Security partnerships have their place, particularly in areas like counter-narcotics cooperation or disaster response. But they cannot substitute for economic engagement as the foundation of influence. Latin American governments care most about delivering development, employment, and economic growth to their citizens. Whoever helps them accomplish those goals most effectively will have influence. Right now, that’s China, not the United States.
JZ: What led you to develop the concept of “economic displacement” in your book as a framework for analyzing U.S.-China rivalry in Latin America? How does this framework differ from other approaches to understanding geopolitical influence in the region?
FU: I developed the concept of economic displacement to address three fundamental limitations in existing literature on China-Latin America relations and great power competition more broadly.
First, the existing scholarship was overly focused on Chinese intentionality, trying to prove whether China’s economic engagement was a deliberate geopolitical strategy or merely commercial opportunism. This debate, while intellectually interesting, was both empirically difficult to resolve (given the opacity of Chinese decision-making) and ultimately less important than understanding the structural effects of China’s economic rise. My framework deliberately sidesteps the intentionality question by focusing on outcomes: regardless of whether China intended to displace U.S. influence, the measurable economic weight shifted, and that shift has political consequences.
Second, traditional approaches treated Latin American countries as passive recipients of great power competition, mere objects rather than subjects with their own agency. This was empirically inaccurate and analytically limiting. My research revealed that Latin American domestic actors, including political elites, subnational governments, and private enterprises, actively demanded Chinese economic goods to solve their own developmental challenges. The concept of economic displacement explicitly incorporates this agency by recognizing that displacement occurs when there is both supply (Chinese provision of goods) and demand (Latin American needs that aren’t being met by the United States).
Third, existing frameworks struggled to explain variation: why did China’s economic influence grow more in some countries than others? Why did some governments successfully leverage Chinese engagement while others became dependent? Economic displacement as a framework provides analytical clarity by breaking the phenomenon into measurable components: trade, investment, credit, and aid, all relative to each country’s GDP. This allows for precise, quantitative assessment of when and where displacement occurs.
The framework differs fundamentally from traditional realist approaches that focus on military capabilities or from liberal institutionalist approaches that emphasize international organizations and norms. Instead, it draws on Susan Strange’s concept of structural power, particularly in the production and financial structures. Economic weight, as I define it, reflects the power exerted by one country on another through economic interactions, but crucially, it’s positional and relational rather than absolute. China doesn’t need to be the world’s largest economy to economically displace the United States in specific countries; it just needs to have greater economic weight in those particular bilateral relationships.
This approach also differs from economic statecraft literature, which typically assumes that economic tools are wielded intentionally by states to achieve foreign policy objectives. My framework recognizes that structural economic power can create political effects even without intentional strategy. China’s growing economic weight constrains choices and shapes incentives for Latin American governments whether or not Beijing deliberately designed it that way…
The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) and not those of The Carter Center.
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