NEW POLL: CHINA PULSE
Chinese public opinion on U.S.-China relations, Taiwan, Russia, and China's neighbors in Asia
China Pulse is a twice-annual survey of Chinese public opinion on international relations conducted by The Carter Center’s China Focus initiative and Emory University’s Department of Political Science. Below, I’ve included the key findings from all four briefs in the inaugural wave of this project, including:
U.S.-China relations - why Chinese people believe the United States is a national security threat, and where they believe there is common interest
U.S.-China trade conflict - how and why Chinese people believe the conflict will eventually be settled, and what they are willing to sacrifice not to capitulate to U.S. trade demands
Taiwan - why Chinese people believe it is important, what kind of military action they support to prevent de jure independence, and what policies they prefer to strengthen cross-strait relations
Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, & the Philippines - where China should (and should not) offer military support, where economic cooperation is the limit of a no-limits partnership, whether anything can be traded for Beijing to back off controversial territorial claims, and how to respond to regional militarization
Where from here? We are currently working on a publicly available dashboard that will allow anyone to explore the data by questions, demographics, and the six geographic regions this survey uses for sampling. In about six months, the dataset behind this survey will be freely available to researchers after application and signing an agreement on citation and usage. We are working on getting our next wave into the field as soon as possible. The goal is to capture changes in Chinese public opinion as they happen, especially regarding the United States and broader implications of the rivalry.
Thanks,
Nick
U.S.-China Relations Overall
Chinese public sentiment toward the United States remained relatively low throughout the latter half of 2025, ranking 37 (July – August 2025) and 34 (October 2025 – January 2025) out of 100.
Although public sentiment toward the United States fell across all demographics, respondents in higher income brackets tended to rank the United States higher on a feeling thermometer.
Most of the Chinese public views the United States as a national security threat, and this attitude increased over the last half of 2025 (61% in July – August 2025 vs. 73% in October 2025 – January 2026).
The most important threats the United States poses to China’s national security in the eyes of the Chinese public are related to Taiwan (83%) and international economics and trade (80%). Only minorities indicated a threat from American cultural (45%) and political (31%) values.
Despite negative sentiment toward the United States, most Chinese believe the United States and China have common interests in international economics and trade (75%), global security (71%), technological innovation (68%), and public health (53%).
In a break with the past, where people-to-people exchanges received broad support, only 29 percent of the Chinese public believes the United States and China have common interests in education.
Concerning recent changes and threats to visas for Chinese studying and working in America, a plurality (40%) of the Chinese public believes their government should match the U.S. approach and begin restricting Americans living in China.
U.S.-China Trade Conflict
A majority of the Chinese public believe that the United States and China will eventually reach a balanced trade agreement with low tariffs on both sides (57%). Although a minority, the next most predicted outcome is the United States will make great concessions to China (29%).
A plurality of the Chinese public believes an agreement will be reached because the economic damage from tariffs is too costly for both sides (45%). A smaller portion believe tariff-induced inflation in the United States will compel Washington to back down (29%).
Most Chinese expect their economy to grow despite continued trade conflict with the United States (49%), but the plurality expect this growth to be slow (37%).The Chinese public wants their government to retaliate if the United States initiates a trade war even if retaliation harms China’s economy (62%).
Preferred methods of trade war retaliation include rare earth export controls (66%), tariffs of U.S. products (58%), limiting U.S. companies’ access to the Chinese market (52%), shifting exports away from the United States (52%), and banning U.S. agricultural products (51%).
Rare earth restrictions are also the most preferred response to continued restrictions on chip exports to China (40%), above increased investment in China’s semiconductor industry (35%), bypassing restrictions through third countries (21%), and direct U.S.-China negotiations (4%).
Taiwan
Most Chinese (83%) who believe the United States is a national security threat rank the Taiwan issue as the largest danger.
The Chinese public expresses generally warm sentiments toward Taiwan, ranking it 57 out of 100 on a feeling thermometer in the summer of 2025 and 62 out of 100 in the fall and winter of the same year.
Geopolitical strategy and technological competition are not the top reasons the Chinese public views Taiwan as important. Instead, Chinese value Taiwan for historical and cultural reasons common to nationalist discourse, indicating that unification would resolve a long-standing historical issue (80%), both mainland China and Taiwan share a common cultural heritage (71%), and Taiwan is part of the United States’ geostrategic containment of China (67%).
Despite the centrality of high-tech competition to discussions of U.S.-China rivalry in the West, only a minority (45%) of the Chinese public view Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing as an important factor in the island’s value to the mainland.
There is no clear commitment to pacifism or militarism toward Taiwan. In the July-August 2025 wave of this survey, a small majority (51%) of the Chinese public agreed Taiwan should not be unified by military force under any circumstances (29% disagreed). In the October-January wave, there was no majority opinion (38% agree vs. 45% disagree).
The Chinese public most prefer non-military paths to improving cross-strait relations, including promoting cultural (86%) and economic (81%) ties with Taiwan as well as policies to encourage Taiwanese businesspeople and students to live and work in mainland China (68%).
Should Taiwan declare de jure independence from the mainland, the Chinese public supports limited military operations on offshore islands (81%) and economic sanctions (62%) as a response over a full-scale military attack (32%).
Twice as many Chinese people agree the use of military force will only make the Taiwan issue worse (50%) than disagree (24%).
Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, & the Philippines
The Chinese public holds favorable views of Taiwan, Russia, and Singapore, rating them 62, 56, and 50, respectively, on a scale of 0 to 100.
The Chinese public holds unfavorable views of 7 out of 10 of China’s neighboring countries, including Thailand (38/100), South Korea (35/100), Vietnam (30/100), Philippines (27/100), India (25/100), Cambodia (22/100), and Japan (21/100).
A plurality of the Chinese public believe that China will benefit from a Russian victory in the Russia-Ukraine war (43%). About one quarter disagree.
Most Chinese people believe their government should strengthen economic cooperation with Russia whether sanctions are levied against Russia (67%) or China-Russia cooperation results in sanctions against China (59%).
A plurality of the Chinese public believe China should not send troops to Russia to support its war with Ukraine (44%). Only 28 percent support committing troops.
Like views on Russia, most Chinese support their government providing economic support to North Korea despite sanctions against that country (56%). However, unlike views on Russia, a plurality of the Chinese public also supports their government continuing to provide military support to North Korea (42%).
The Chinese public is willing to bargain and make concessions on Beijing’s territorial claims. When asked to consider hypothetical proposals from the Philippines that would result in China backing down on claims in the South China Sea, a plurality of the Chinese public supported negotiation if Manila reduced military cooperation with the United States (43%) or terminated its U.S. mutual defense treaty (43%).
In response to scenarios in which Japan changed its constitution to allow offensive military actions and South Korea developed nuclear weapons, the Chinese public most approved of Beijing responding by increasing military spending (66% and 63%, respectively). In the South Korea scenario, increasing military spending was tied with diplomatic protest (63%).
Peace is always on the back foot. To promote peaceful cooperation between the United States and China, all content from the Monitor is provided here for free. If you would like to contribute to our work, please feel free to make a donation to The Carter Center. Please indicate your donation is for China Focus.
That’s all from Atlanta. Y’all be good.
I'd be grateful if you'd include more details on the survey methodology in the report. I see the number of respondents but little about the actual way in which the survey was conducted. Can you shoot me a note or something? Thanks, Nick!
Great insights! Some of the findings on attitudes toward non-US countries are a little surprising